Time is Not on Peace’s Side: The Life and Death of the Peace Talks on Syria

Two years after the Geneva I conference on Syria, in which the United States and Russia expressed support for a political transition, and a few months after the Geneva II conference, which was marked by unsuccessful discussions between the regime and the opposition, the diplomatic process is now all but dead. With the planned renewal of Bashar al-Asad’s presidential mandate in a no-contest election in June 2014, and the probable recognition of the results by Iran and Russia, the Syrian regime and its allies are trying to shift the aims of the international diplomatic efforts from political transition to the formation of a national unity government. The latter solution would be a victory in disguise for the regime, and it is therefore unacceptable for an opposition which, while on retreat in the centre of the country, is not going to be militarily defeated in the foreseeable future.

At first glance, the failure of the Geneva process may seem to result from recent developments, in particular the Syrian regime’s renewed sense of confidence following major military gains. However, by the time of Geneva I, the fact that loyalist forces were still in control of a greater part of Syria’s territory than they are today did not prevent Russia from showing more goodwill than during Geneva II. I argue that a more fundamental factor in the deterioration of the situation is the excessively great amount of time that was allowed to pass between the two Geneva meetings. Time has not only allowed the situation on the ground to worsen considerably, while providing Asad and his allies with the opportunity to prepare and carry out successful counter-offensives. It has also contributed to the desensitisation of the international community towards the regime’s indiscriminate use of violence, thereby gradually making Russia’s defence of Asad less uncomfortable than it was by early 2012. Time has also offered Asad the opportunity to wait until a June 2014 presidential election he had always had the intention to run and win, and which Moscow had probably always thought of using as a pretext for opting out of the transition talks.